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CEO Incentive Contracts in China: Why Does City Location Matter

Author: Alex Bryson ; John Forth ; Minghai Zhou Abstract
Source: The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
Publication date: 2013
Document type:
Vol.: CEO incentive contracts are commonplace in China but their incidence varies significantly across Chinese cities. We show that city and provincial policy experiments help explain this variance. We examine the role of two policy experiments: the use of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and the rate at which state owned enterprises (SOEs) were privatised. CEO incentive contracts are negatively correlated with foreign ownership and with the introduction of FDI via SEZs. However, the SEZ effect disappears having accounted for the city-level composition of firms and executives
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